The Barcan formula in metaphysics by Simchen, Ori
  
THEORIA 78 (2013): 375-392 
The Barcan Formula in Metaphysics * 
Ori SIMCHEN 
Received: 02.11.2012 
Final version: 17.02.2013 
BIBLID [0495-4548 (2013) 28: 78; pp. 375-392]           
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.6918 
ABSTRACT: The Barcan formula (BF) is widely considered a threat to actualism. I show how BF can be cleared of 
such a charge by construing it as a bridge principle connecting modality de dicto and modality de re while re-
taining a Russellian robust sense of reality in modal matters. 
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RESUMEN: La fórmula Barcan (FB) se considera por lo general una amenaza al realismo. Muestro de qué modo FB 
puede verse libre de esta imputación si se construye como un principio puente que conecte la modalidad de 
dicto y la modalidad de re al mismo tiempo que retiene un sentido russelliano robusto de realidad en cuestio-
nes modales. 
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1. Introduction 
The Barcan formula is a schema introduced by Ruth Barcan Marcus as an axiom 
schema in her pioneering work on quantified modal logic (QML): 
(BF)  ◊∃xφx → ∃x ◊φx.1  
It is paraphrased as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be a φ, 
then something or other is possibly a φ. Together with its converse CBF it gives ex-
pression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical 
quantification.  But it is customary nowadays to think of BF as posing a threat to a 
view in modal metaphysics known as ‘actualism’, roughly the claim that there are no 
non-actual (or ‘merely possible’) things.2 This, we are told, is regrettable if true to the 
extent that BF is validated by the most straightforward systems of quantified modal 
logic and actualism is highly plausible and attractive in its own right. So it would be a 
                                                      
* Thanks to Roberta Ballarin, Paul Bartha, Steve Savitt, and audiences at the University of British Colum-
bia, CUNY Graduate Center, and Lewis and Clark.  Some of the ideas developed here were originally 
presented in the form of a comment on Williamson (forthcoming a) at a LOGOS conference on Me-
ta-Metaphysics held in Barcelona in 2008. Thanks to the organizers of the conference and its partici-
pants as well. 
1 A version of it first appears as axiom schema 11 in Barcan (1946).  Another formulation is  
  ∀x □φx → □∀xφx, 
 but the ◊∃ construal is more intuitively accessible. 
2 I will focus throughout on metaphysical modality and will have nothing to say about other sorts: epis-
temic, deontic, etc. 
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shame if BF had these anti-actualist (or ‘possibilist’) implications. Thus we read in Lin-
sky and Zalta (1994, 431): 
[S]imple QML has many controversial features, not the least of which are that it validates the 
Barcan formula and appears to require quantification over possibilia.  Whereas possibilists em-
ploy distinctions that render these features of simple QML unobjectionable, actualists find the 
distinctions and the controversial features difficult to accept.  
And in Williamson (1998, 258-259) we read: 
[I]f possibilia are what could exist, then the anti-actualist can defend BF and BFC by positing 
non-existent possibilia and quantifying over existent and non-existent possibilia.  Given actual-
ism, there are no non-existent possibilia to be quantified over, and BF and BFC look much less 
attractive.          
Much effort and ingenuity have gone into attempts to reconcile systems of QML that 
validate BF with a commitment to actualism. We will return to such efforts below.  It 
is scarcely remembered, however, that the originator of BF had strong actualist lean-
ings. These can be seen as closely allied with her endorsement of the principle. Here 
are representative passages from Marcus (1986): 
In my own sketch of a semantics for modal logic [in Marcus (1962)], the domains of individuals 
assigned to alternative worlds were coextensive.  Given that one of the worlds is the actual world, 
no entities are spawned that are not in this world and no entities of this world are absent in oth-
ers.  That is consistent with the axiom, variations on which came to be known as the ‘Barcan 
formula’. (195) 
Later, following a brief sketch of Kripke’s variable domains semantics, we read: 
Despite the elegant generality of the formal extension of model theory to modalities that allows 
variable domains, many of the examples given of possibilia are among those that could be ac-
commodated by the theory of descriptions and do not seem to require variable domains.  Never-
theless, the semantics accommodates possibilia.  But modalities in their primary use concern coun-
terfactuals about actual objects, and to reintroduce possibilia is to run counter to the admonition 
of Russell that we ‘retain our robust sense of reality’. (197) 
See also Russell (1919, 152). A plausible reconstruction of the position here is as fol-
lows.  Modality is primarily about actual things and their possible configurations. This 
allots a certain priority to so-called possibility de re, to what is possible for particular 
things, over what is possible in general, or possibility de dicto.  Given this as a meta-
physical default, a formal semantics of a particular sort that validates BF is called for.  
Formulas reporting certain de dicto modal facts, together with suitable instances of BF, 
would entail ones reporting certain de re modal facts.  That modality de dicto of the rele-
vant kind should have such de re modal implications provides some expression to the 
overall idea that possibilities de dicto do not float free from what is possible for particu-
lar things, thus allowing us to retain a robust sense of reality in modal matters.   
 My aim in what follows is to fill in the details of this initial reconstruction and 
make a case, given a general antecedent commitment to the Russellian sentiment, for 
BF as a metaphysical principle. This will require first and foremost delving into the 
distinction between modality de re and de dicto, which will be the first order of business.  
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My concern will be with BF and not with its converse CBF—it is only the former that 
is relevant to the question whether there are merely possible things.3 
 One last prefatory remark before turning to the details: It might be thought that a 
schema such as BF formulated with respect to the language of QML, being a logical 
principle, could not be understood as a metaphysical principle. Logic and metaphysics, 
however their respective aims are to be characterized, are distinct enterprises, and to 
consider BF as a metaphysical principle is to fail to heed this distinction.  This charge 
runs deep and I cannot do it full justice here. For present purposes suffice it to say 
that despite being a schema for syntactic constructions of the language of QML, BF 
taken as a metaphysical principle should seem no more problematic than that a princi-
ple formulated in English should be understood as a metaphysical principle.  As far as 
the relation between logic and metaphysics goes, the position I set out to defend 
would align itself in a fuller treatment of the topic with the following influential pas-
sage from Russell (1919, 152): 
Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned 
with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features.   
BF as a metaphysical principle would accordingly limn abstract and general modal fea-
tures of reality. The Russellian orientation that considers BF in this way certainly raises 
important issues concerning the relation between the principle itself, with its assumed 
generality, and the specific truths that exhibit it, but in what follows I will dodge this 
larger issue and move back and forth between speaking of the obtaining of the princi-
ple in re and the truth of its particular manifestations. 
2. De re and de dicto 
Consider the following report: 
(1) Something might have occupied the corner.   
This has a reading on which  
(2)  it is possible for something in particular to occupy the corner, 
and a reading on which  
(3)  it is possible that there be something occupying the corner. 
The facts reported in (2) and (3) are intuitively different: (2) reports what is possible for 
something, namely, occupying the corner (treating the property as monadic rather 
than dyadic for convenience), whereas (3) reports what is generally possible, namely, 
that there be something or other occupying the corner. In (2) the modal appears to 
modify a thing (res) bearing a property, whereas in (3) the modal appears to modify a 
statement (dictum).  
 We note in passing that this way of capturing the contrast between de re and de dicto 
is prima facie not via matters of scope, as in  
                                                      
3 Left out of consideration, then, are CBF’s implications for the position known as ‘serious actualism’—
the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it 
of any kind, including its very non-existence. 
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(2’) for some x (possibly (x occupies the corner)), 
and 
(3’) possibly (for some x (x occupies the corner)),  
but, rather, via a difference between the dyadic possibility-for and the monadic possi-
bility-that, which is how the tradition following Peter Abelard would have it.4 The 
scopal contrast exhibited by (2’) and (3’) is a logical capture of an old metaphysical 
contrast.  
 Now, the status of generalities in re can seem perplexing, and de dicto facts of the 
form ◊∃xφx are generalities: they obtain to the extent that it is possible as a general 
matter that there be a φ. It is prima facie plausible that what is generally possible should 
be constrained by what is specifically possible for particular things. This is so because 
it seems plausible that general possibilities obtain only because specific possibilities for 
particular things do. The alternative can easily strike us as mysterious when considered 
in light of certain analogies.  Consider an example adapted from Russell (1919): say I 
met a man. My having met a man took place only because I met some man in particu-
lar. It is not as if I could have met a man as a general matter without having met some 
man in particular. We might ask whether or not the very fact that I met a man could 
have obtained had I not met Jones in particular but rather Smith instead. But we can-
not take seriously the idea that I could have met a man as a general matter without 
having met some man in particular. Meeting a man does not float free from meeting a 
particular man. Assuming that meetings are parts of reality, what would it mean for 
meetings to obtain as a general matter without having witnesses in specific meetings 
among particular individuals? 
 Assuming that general possibilities of the form ◊∃xφx are also parts of reality, a 
way of capturing the idea that general possibilities obtain only because possibilities for 
particular things do is to commit to instances of BF as metaphysical truths. This 
would offer some vindication of the view that there is no deep metaphysical chasm 
between de dicto and de re modality. De dicto modality of a certain sort would then have 
de re modal implications: what things might be like in general would entail what is pos-
sible for particular things. 
 I regard such considerations as providing the most compelling support for BF as a 
metaphysical principle.  I will return to them in more detail below after examining two 
competing defenses of BF as a metaphysical principle: a logic-first approach that is-
sues from considerations concerning the logical status of the schema, and a metaphys-
ics-first approach that issues from considerations concerning the nature of the totality 
of things.  After detailing shortcomings of the other two general approaches to the 
topic, I will return to my preferred metaphysics-first approach that issues from con-
siderations concerning the nature of metaphysical modality itself.  
                                                      
4 According to Abelard, genuine modality is really only of the former dyadic kind: modality as a mode     
of predication, modifying the subject-predicate—or better, the object-attribute—link. See Kneale 
(1962), especially the discussion at pp. 624-627. See also 2.5 of King (2004). I explore this and related 
matters in Chapter 1 of Simchen (2012). 
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3.  First strategy: logic-first   
One might argue for BF as a metaphysical principle indirectly via its theoremhood in 
systems of QML that have certain obvious theoretical virtues.5 The naturalness, sim-
plicity, and facility with metalogical results of the version of QML at issue might be 
seen as recommending instances of BF as metaphysical truths. An immediate problem 
with this line, however, is that it is far from clear what theoretical virtues of a formal 
system—straightforwardness of proofs of soundness and completeness, say—have to 
do with metaphysical truth. It can easily seem mysterious that the right logic meta-
physically speaking should also be the one with the most elegant metalogic. A defense 
is surely needed for this type of consideration of metaphysical truth via theoremhood 
so as to dispel the air of mystery. And the explanatory burden here seems very high. 
 A more elaborate logic-first defense of BF is found in Williamson (1998) and 
(forthcoming a). A line of thought emanating from Kripke (1963) considers truth 
conditions for the schemata ◊∃xφx and ∃x ◊φx without prejudice to what individuals 
there might be, and claims them to diverge. The first schema is made true by an as-
signment to φ of an extension at some world that includes an individual in that world.  
The second schema is made true by an assignment to φ of an extension at some world 
that includes an actual individual. Clearly, without prejudice to what individuals there 
might be, fulfillment of the first condition does not entail fulfillment of the second 
condition. The invalidity of BF is easily shown. Kripke’s proposed variable domains 
semantics for QML assigns domains of quantification to worlds and lets the exten-
sions of predicates at worlds be drawn from the union set of these domains. A foe of 
BF can take inspiration from such a framework and claim that while it is indeed pos-
sible that there be a talking donkey (let us suppose), it is not possible for any actual 
thing in particular to be such. What makes it generally possible that there be a talking 
donkey is not what is possible for anything actual. The possibility of there being a talk-
ing donkey is found compatible with there being nothing actual that is possibly a talk-
ing donkey, thus falsifying the relevant instance of BF.   
 Williamson’s response to such claims is to point out that putative counterexamples 
to BF, couched in a variable domains semantics for QML, are offered in a metalan-
guage whose quantifiers do not abide by strictures specified for object-level quantifica-
tion.  Thus, a counterexample to BF requires an assignment of a non-empty extension 
to φ at some world where this extension includes some non-actual individual and no 
actual individual falls in the extension of φ at any world. The quantifiers of the non-
modal metalanguage—e.g. ‘some non-actual individual’—are presumed to range over 
individuals outside the actual domain of quantification. This makes purported coun-
terexamples to BF invariably philosophically unsatisfying. Counterexamples to BF are 
undermined by the requirement that the non-modal metalanguage quantifiers function 
differently from object language quantifiers at the actual world. 
                                                      
5 Examples of such systems are SQML endorsed by Linsky and Zalta and LPC=S5 endorsed by Wi-
lliamson. See Linsky and Zalta (1994) and Williamson (1998), respectively.
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 Let us observe that as a general matter discrepancy between assigned domains for 
meta- and object-level quantification are routine. To see why this is supposed to be 
problematic in the present case requires that we move beyond the viability of this or 
that model theory for QML. A variable domains approach clearly invalidates BF, but 
this is beside the present philosophical point. Williamson’s thought, rather, is that un-
der the intended interpretation of the non-modal metalanguage, the domain over which 
the metalanguage quantifiers range is restricted to actuality, which is also the domain 
of quantification that the intended interpretation of the modal object language assigns 
to the actual world.  But because purported counterexamples to BF require that quan-
tification in the metalanguage extend beyond that, there can be no genuine counterex-
amples to BF under the intended interpretation of the non-modal metalanguage.6 
 Williamson’s complaint against purported counterexamples to BF, couched in a 
variable domain semantics for QML, raises doubts, however. The idea that under the 
intended interpretation of the non-modal metalanguage the domain of quantification 
is restricted to the domain of quantification of modal object language quantification at 
the actual world under the intended interpretation of the latter is not obvious. Consid-
er, for example, the fact that quantification over possible worlds under the intended 
interpretation of the non-modal metalanguage is quantification over items that prima 
facie fall outside the range of modal object language quantifiers at the actual world un-
der the intended interpretation of the latter. Observing strictures of modal object lan-
guage quantification at the actual world in the non-modal metalanguage would seem 
to preclude quantification over possible worlds other than the actual world.  Suppose, 
however, that in a reductionist spirit possible worlds are identified with maximally 
consistent sets of sentences while possible individuals are identified with sets of one-
place open formulas. It is unclear why a foe of BF could not then hold that under the 
intended interpretation of the non-modal metalanguage the domain of quantification 
includes sets of formulas, whereas under the intended interpretation of the modal ob-
ject language the actual domain does not. 
 It may also be wondered why counterexamples to BF couched in a variable do-
mains semantics for QML could not in principle be given without the appearance of 
quantification over mere possibilia altogether.  Setting the previous point aside, a foe 
of BF might say that the possibility that there be a talking donkey requires that the 
property of being a talking donkey be instantiated at some world or other, which ob-
tains (let us suppose) for reasons having to do with the non-contradictoriness of the 
property, while the possibility for something or other of being a talking donkey re-
quires that being a talking donkey be instantiated at some world or other by some ac-
                                                      
6 The option of resorting to a modal metalanguage—as in, for example, Fine (1977)—is unsatisfying in a 
different way.  Falling back on a modal metalanguage can leave us none the wiser about the status of 
BF. A foe of BF might try to argue in a modal metalanguage that the object language ◊∃xφx is true 
just in case a world-proposition entailing that something φs might have been true whereas ∃x ◊φx is 
true just in case for some actual thing a world-proposition entailing that thing φ-ing might have been 
true, and that fulfillment of the first condition does not entail fulfillment of the second.  But our ju-
dgment as to whether or not this is really so does not seem robust enough to afford independent as-
sessment of BF. See also the discussion in Williamson (forthcoming a, 13-14).  
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tual thing, which fails to obtain (let us suppose) for reasons having to do with the fact 
that none of the actual donkeys could talk and nothing that is not already a donkey 
could be a donkey.  And it might be supposed that the variable domains semantics 
provides a formal framework for rendering such divergences perspicuous. The seman-
tics portrays the possible instantiation of φ-ing not by anything actual as the instantia-
tion of φ-ing by something non-actual, but the latter is merely a façon de parler for heu-
ristic purposes.7 This line of criticism of BF does not obviously require quantification 
over non-actual things. Talk of something non-actual φ-ing is replaced by talk of the 
instantiation of φ-ing being non-contradictory while every possibility of an actual thing 
φ-ing is excluded. If, against appearances to the contrary, this type of formulation of 
counterexamples to BF requires illicit quantification over non-actual things after all, 
then this would need to be shown. 
 Even if we set all these issues aside, the point about comparing metalanguage 
quantification with object language quantification does little to unsettle the intuitive 
appeal of the purported counterexamples.  As Williamson (1998, 264) observes, 
[t]he foregoing remarks do not yet rehabilitate BF and [CBF], for they do not undermine the in-
tuitive force of the supposed counterexamples.  What they undermine is only the idea that the 
relativized domains approach constitutes a satisfactory theoretical underpinning for the supposed 
counterexamples.   
We will return to the issue of why we find purported counterexamples to BF intuitive-
ly compelling in section 6 below.  Clearly, an argument against an argument against the 
intended truth of an instance of BF does not gage the question of the status of BF as a 
metaphysical principle directly and leaves us hopeful for a more direct vindication of 
the principle. 
 A final stab at a logic-first vindication of BF (and CBF) broached by Williamson 
(forthcoming b) centers on the observation that a certain second-order comprehen-
sion principle validated by the second-order modal logic that naturally extends Kripke 
(1963) undermines the intended failure of first-order BF (and CBF).  The principle is 
roughly that given any condition on individuals, there is a property that as a matter of 
necessity is instantiated by all and only the individuals satisfying the condition.  The 
trouble is that it is a consequence of this comprehension principle that the property of 
not being a given individual (the individual’s ‘negative haecceity’) exists necessarily.  So 
with respect to any counterexample to BF offered under the auspices of Kripke (1963) 
there will be some individual that does not actually exist but whose negative haecceity 
does actually exist. But how, wonders Williamson, could such a property exist in a 
world in which the individual whose negative haecceity it is does not exist? Williamson 
then goes on to explore possible rejoinders on behalf of the foe of BF (and CBF) and 
finds them philosophically wanting. Unfortunately, neither the comprehension princi-
                                                      
7 Such a position would constitute a resounding endorsement of a fundamental metaphysical divide bet-
ween de dicto and de re possibility discussed earlier, which we have independent reasons to reject, but 
we can set this controversy aside for the purpose of examining the intrinsic merit of the response to 
the Kripke (1963)-inspired objection to BF. The present point is that Kripke’s variable domain se-
mantics might be viewed by the foe of BF as a useful heuristic and nothing more.  
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ple in question, nor the requirement that a negative haecceity existentially depends on 
the individual whose negative haecceity it is, is sufficiently intuitively compelling to 
provide an effective vindication of BF as a metaphysical principle, leaving us with the 
uneasy sense that the logical cart is being put before the metaphysical horse here. 
 Might BF be approached via reflection on the nature of the totality of things as 
such and on what it is for things to bear properties they do not in fact bear? We would 
be giving up the effort to argue indirectly via theoremhood, or via some self-defeating 
characteristic of purported testifiers to the invalidity of BF under the intended inter-
pretation, and argue for BF as a metaphysical principle by considering what it is for 
things to possibly bear properties and whether or not there might have been more 
things than there actually are.  
4. Second strategy: metaphysics-first—the totality of things 
An argument for BF as a metaphysical principle might be offered via independent 
considerations in favor of a modally invariant totality of things.  A clear illustration of 
success for such a strategy is provided by mathematical cases, where the size and 
makeup of the realm of mathematical things is closed to modal variation. When it 
comes to mathematics, the plausibility of BF as a metaphysical principle is driven by 
considerations pertaining to the nature of mathematical entities and structure.  As we 
will see, however, such considerations do not generalize easily outside the mathemati-
cal context. To appreciate this we turn to a case study brought to contemporary philo-
sophical attention by Kripke (1980).   
 In the course of drawing the now-familiar distinction between the epistemic cate-
gory of a priori truth and the metaphysical category of necessary truth, Kripke famous-
ly discusses Goldbach’s conjecture as a prime example—the conjecture that every 
even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes. It is a conjecture, Kripke reminds 
us, and so surely not an a priori truth.  Suppose, however, that the conjecture is in fact 
true.  Is it possibly false?  Surely not, reasons Kripke.  For if every even number great-
er than 2 is in fact the sum of two primes, then this fact about each such number is 
verifiable by direct computation. And so, assuming the results of direct computation 
to be necessary, it is necessary with respect to the number in question. How, then, 
could there have been an even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two 
primes? Thus Kripke (1980, 36-37):   
What would that mean? Such a number would have to be one of 4, 6, 8, 10, …; and by hypothe-
sis, since we are assuming Goldbach’s conjecture to be true, each of these can be shown, again by 
direct computation, to be the sum of two primes. Goldbach’s conjecture, then, cannot be contin-
gently true or false; whatever truth-value it has belongs to it by necessity.  
The argument is a tad compressed. We reconstruct it. Goldbach’s conjecture is the 
claim that  
(GC) for every x (if x is even and x > 2, then for some y, z (y is prime and z is 
prime and y + z = x)). 
Possible falsity for GC is that 
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(†) possibly (for some x (x is even and x > 2 and for every y, z (if y is prime and 
z is prime, then y + z ≠ x))). 
From this, Kripke reasons, it follows that 
(‡) for some x (possibly (x is even and x > 2 and for every y, z (if y is prime and 
z is prime, then y + z ≠ x))). 
But now, given the truth of GC, it is true for every even number greater than 2 that it 
is the sum of two primes. And this is necessary for each such number—it is verifiable 
by direct computation—which belies the existence of a number for which it is possi-
ble to be even, greater than two, and not the sum of two primes, as per (‡). For what 
could such existence amount to? It would render modal number theory ω-
inconsistent. We conclude, then, that if GC is true, then it is necessarily so.8   
 Let us pause to consider the grounds for the Kripkean transition from (†) to (‡).  
Why do we, following Kripke, find the transition from (†) to (‡) to be so obviously 
plausible?  An initial thought might be that the transition is grounded in a modal logic 
that validates BF. The transition would then be a simple application of modus ponens.  
But, firstly, this cannot lie behind Kripke’s own handling of the case for the obvious 
reason that Kripke’s proposed version of QML famously invalidates BF. And second-
ly, and more importantly, to fall back on a certain logical framework merely pushes 
back the explanatory challenge: What is it in the metaphysics that should impel us to 
adopt a framework that validates such a principle? Kripke himself appears to sub-
scribe to the intended truth of the particular instance of BF we are considering, and 
there seem to be other such endorsements found in his work,9 but we need to look 
deeper into the metaphysics of the situation for a clue to the transition from (†) to (‡). 
 It might be thought that a distinctly metaphysical source for the transition is that a 
general hostility to mere possibilia would inform a more specific hostility to merely 
possible numbers, the kind of thing required to sustain the truth of (†) in the face of 
the falsity of (‡). For it seems that the only way for (†) to be true while (‡) is false is 
that there be merely possible numbers.  If (‡) is false, then for none of the numbers in 
actuality is it possible to be even, greater than 2, and not the sum of two primes. Un-
der such conditions, what might still render (†) true? Given the falsity of (‡), it will not 
be whatever is possible for any of the actual numbers.  Nor, on the other hand, will it 
be whatever is possible for any other actual thing if we assume that for no non-
                                                      
8 Letting GC be ∀x(even x ∧ x > 2 → ∃y∃z (prime y ∧ prime z ∧ y + z = x)) we have the following 
 Claim:  GC →□ GC  
 Proof:  We suppose for reductio that GC while ◊¬GC and let G(x) be: even x ∧ x > 2 → ∃y∃z (prime 
y ∧ prime z ∧ y + z = x).  If GC, then by UI for every n, G(n), which can be shown by direct compu-
tation; thus, for every n, □G(n).  On the other hand, ◊¬GC is equivalent to (†) ◊∃x¬G(x), from 
which it follows that (‡)∃x ◊¬G(x), which is equivalent to (‡´)∃x ¬□G(x), which is ω-inconsistent 
with □G(n) for every n. 
9 See 2.3 of Simchen (2012) for a reading of the cryptic unicorn remarks in Kripke (1980) according to 
which Kripke is tacitly committed to the idea that if possibly (for some x (x is the unicorn species)), 
then for some x (possibly (x is the unicorn species)). 
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number is it possible to be even—never mind being greater than 2 and not the sum of 
two primes. (Pre-theoretically, such possibilities as being even are tailor-made for 
numbers.) The only remaining plausible option, it seems, is that there be merely pos-
sible numbers.10 And a general hostility to mere possibilia would rule this out, thus le-
gitimating the transition in question.   
 However, it is unclear how to assess the question of the existence of merely possi-
ble numbers at such a level of abstraction.  It is generally far from clear, for example, 
that a merely possible ψ is a ψ that is merely possible. Attributive adjectival construc-
tions that do not license an inference from being a φψ to being a ψ are amply famil-
iar—a fake Rembrandt that is not a Rembrandt and a rubber duck that is not a duck 
are obvious examples. More relevantly, it certainly does not seem to be the case that a 
potential ψ is a ψ, one that is also potential. A potential parent, for example, is not a 
parent at all and so not a parent that is potential (whatever that might mean). Given 
such lack of clarity surrounding being a merely possible ψ in general, it seems far bet-
ter to consider the specifics of the mathematical case and see whether they generalize 
outside the mathematical context, rather than consider the general case first and then 
see whether it applies to the specifics of the mathematical case. 
5.  The mathematical plenum vs. plena of all things 
 A compelling metaphysical source for the Kripkean transition from (†) to (‡) is the 
nature of the structure of the numbers. We just mooted the idea that the only way for 
(†) to be true while (‡) is false is for there to be merely possible numbers. And yet, we 
now reflect, there cannot be additional numbers to those that actually exist: the struc-
ture of the numbers is fully saturated with its entities and is exactly the way it has to 
be. There is simply no room in the mathematical plenum, which is exactly how it has 
to be, to accommodate an additional number. Consider first whether there could have 
been an additional number occupying the location actually occupied by one of the ac-
tual numbers in its stead.11 What makes this option impossible is that it is not possible 
that there be fewer numbers than there actually are due to the natures of the numbers, 
taken severally, which require each of the numbers to exist necessarily. We might then 
suppose that this by itself could carry the weight of a general denial of the existence of 
merely possible numbers. But it is not quite so. We would need to appeal to the nature 
of the mathematical plenum, the nature of the numbers taken collectively, to drive the 
general point home. For even if we assume that each of the numbers had to exist—
thus ruling out the possibility of a merely possible number possibly occupying the lo-
cation actually occupied by one of the actual numbers—this by itself does not yet 
force the conclusion that there could not be an additional number.  For that result, the 
                                                      
10 We may suppose that on the present line of thought the Carnapian suggestion that the truth of (†) de-
rives from the non-contradictoriness of the instantiation of being an even prime number greater than 
two and not the sum of two primes is not considered a plausible alternative. 
11 I set aside structuralist worries about how exactly a merely possible occupant of the location of one of 
the actual numbers is supposed to deliver the truth of (†) in light of the falsity of (‡). 
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essentialist point about the structure of the numbers made above—that it is fully satu-
rated with its entities and is exactly how it has to be—needs to be appealed to as well.  
We might as well dispense with the independent appeal to the natures of the numbers 
taken severally. For when we said that the structure of the numbers is just as it has to 
be, this already included each of the numbers existing necessarily.12 The present claim 
that there could not be merely possible numbers is in the first instance a claim about 
the numbers considered collectively rather than about each of the numbers taken sev-
erally.   
 Whether or not such considerations can be reasonably attributed, based on the 
meager textual evidence, to Kripke’s own endorsement of the transition from (†) to 
(‡), they seem compelling in their own right.  And the lesson to be drawn from this 
for possibilities for numbers is straightforward:  If it is possible in general that there 
be a number answering a certain condition, then the condition is specifically possible 
for one of the numbers.  If the condition could not possibly hold for any of the num-
bers, then it is not possible that there be a number answering the condition after all.  
(Conversely, and equally plausibly except not required for the transition from (†) to 
(‡), if a condition is specifically possible for a particular number, then it is also general-
ly possible that there be a number answering the condition.) Abstracting further from 
the details of the case we can say that what is generally possible here—the possibility 
that there be so-and-so—is straightforwardly constrained by whether it is specifically 
possible for certain things to be so-and-so. The reason why we find this so plausible in 
the mathematical case is that the structure of the numbers is a plenum that is already 
the way it has to be. 
 Our next task is to assess whether this type of consideration could plausibly be ex-
tended outside the mathematical arena, thus providing a totality-of-things vindication 
of BF as a metaphysical principle.  Consider the position defended by Linsky and Zal-
ta, and, independently, Williamson, according to which if it is generally possible that 
there be so-and-so, then something or other in particular is possibly so-and-so. (See 
Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996), and Williamson (1998, 2000).) The view in question is 
the metaphysical analog of a fixed domain semantics for QML, a point to which we 
will return. It is best illustrated by its handling of a familiar difficulty that arises for 
views that are committed to BF as a metaphysical principle.   
 Let it be the case that nothing φs and that φ-ing is such that it cannot be had con-
tingently, meaning that necessarily anything at all is either necessarily φ or else neces-
sarily not-φ. (Equivalently, it is necessary that anything that possibly φs necessarily φs.)  
Then under these conditions, and under an antecedent commitment to BF, the innoc-
uous-seeming assumption that it is generally possible that there be a φ yields a contra-
diction. For then, by the relevant instance of BF, something or other possibly φs, and 
thus necessarily φs, and thus actually φs, contradicting the initial assumption that noth-
ing φs. And yet there is often considerable intuitive pressure to suppose, even under 
                                                      
12 The point is independent of any further structuralist insistence that the natures of the numbers 
themselves are exhausted by their locations in the mathematical plenum. 
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such conditions, that it is possible that there be a φ. A representative example here is 
being Wittgenstein’s child.13 Wittgenstein had no children.  Matters of tense aside, we 
are assuming in accord with BF that if it is possible that Wittgenstein should have had 
a child, then something or other is possibly Wittgenstein’s child. And it is widely 
acknowledged that being Wittgenstein’s child cannot be had contingently: it is neces-
sary that anything at all is either necessarily Wittgenstein’s child or else necessarily not 
his child.14 (Equivalently, it is necessary that anything that is possibly Wittgenstein’s 
child is necessarily Wittgenstein’s child.)  But then, the intuitive verdict that Wittgen-
stein might have had a child contradicts the plain truth that he had no children.  For if 
it is possible that he should have had a child, then, we are assuming, something or 
other is possibly his child, and so, necessarily his child, and so, actually his child, con-
tradicting his having no children. 
 The Linsky-Zalta-Williamson line addresses this problem by espousing the exist-
ence of a thing—a ‘bare possibilium’—that might have been Wittgenstein’s child, a 
thing that must be his child if concrete, and thus is his child if concrete. This thing, 
the bare possibilium, is not a concrete thing in actuality but might have been one. The 
claim that Wittgenstein has no children is true if read as the claim that nothing con-
crete is his child, and false if read as the claim that nothing is his child if concrete.  
The view has it that to every possibility that there be a φ there corresponds something 
that is possibly a φ. If nothing concrete can be found to possibly φ, then the view has 
it that something nonconcrete is possibly φ. There are as many things in actuality as 
are needed to sustain every general possibility of the form ◊∃xφx. There could not be 
more of them or fewer of them.  Like numbers, things in general exist necessarily but 
not necessarily as concreta. This is the metaphysical correlate of a semantics that vali-
dates BF and CBF. 
 The view construes the claim that being Wittgenstein’s child cannot be had contin-
gently as the claim that it is being-Wittgenstein’s-child-strictly-if-concrete that cannot 
be had contingently. ‘Strictly-if’ because the non-strict variant—being-Wittgenstein’s-
child-if-concrete—is had by anything that is not concrete, which for the view in ques-
tion includes all the things that might have been concrete without being Wittgenstein’s 
child. As a quick illustration of the point, consider the fact that I am actually brother-
less. On the view in question a merely possible brother of mine, not actually concrete, 
might have been concrete, in which case it would have been my brother. However, if 
it were being-Wittgenstein’s-child-if-concrete that could not be had contingently, then 
given that my merely possible brother has this property by dint of actually not being 
concrete, my merely possible brother would not only be my brother if it were concrete 
but would also be Wittgenstein’s child if it were concrete—an unwanted result. 
 That things in general are like numbers in existing necessarily raises the question 
whether they are like numbers in other ways too, specifically in forming a structure 
                                                      
13 The example is from Williamson (1998). 
14 For present expository purposes we set aside the question of how to account for necessary predication 
without imputing necessary existence. See Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 of Simchen (2012) for discus-
sion. 
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that is fully saturated with its entities.  Earlier we witnessed the plausibility of the con-
tention that if it is generally possible that some number or other satisfy a certain con-
dition, then it is possible for some number or other to satisfy the condition.  This was 
found plausible because the numbers form a plenum that is just the way it has to be.  
If the same could be said about things in general, then we would have found a clear 
totality-of-things vindication of BF as a metaphysical principle, whereby it would fol-
low from it being generally possible that something or other be so-and-so that it be 
specifically possible for something or other to be so-and-so.   
 However, the considerations adduced above in favor of the Kripkean transition 
from (†) to (‡) seem not to apply beyond the mathematical case. We have no inde-
pendent reasons for thinking that as a general matter the totality of all things, each ex-
isting necessarily, is a plenum that has to be the way it happens to be.  Advocating a 
modally fixed totality of all things to match a fixed domain semantics for a system of 
QML that validates BF (and CBF) falls far short of providing substantive metaphysical 
grounds for supposing that there could not be things in addition to the things there 
are.15 As we witnessed in the mathematical case, such a result will not simply follow 
from the necessary existence of things taken severally—an appeal to the realm of 
things taken collectively would have to be made. But here we clearly come up short.  
And the situation is made worse by the fact that the view under consideration is not 
meant to entail the necessitarian thesis that how things happen to be is how they must 
be. Given that room is to be left for contingency in the configuration of things, the 
task of showing that any such contingency is saturated with its entities seems all the 
more difficult.  We have been given no substantive reason for thinking that as a gen-
eral matter the realm of things is a plenum no matter how the things might have been 
configured.  
6. Third strategy: metaphysics-first—modality  
We finally come to the most direct way of arguing for BF as a metaphysical principle 
that proceeds by way of considering metaphysical possibility as such and its determi-
nants.  This is the approach to de dicto possibilities and their relation to de re possibili-
ties sketched at the beginning of the paper. Here we have another metaphysics-first 
approach whereby the truth of instances of BF is approached directly and not via the-
oremhood, except that here it is not via consideration of the totality of things as such 
as in the previous strategy but of modality itself. The approach seems closest to Mar-
cus’s original motivations.  
 Letting de dicto possibility be what is generally possible without explicit regard to 
what is possible for particular things, on the present approach what is generally possi-
                                                      
15 This is not to deny the systematicity in theoretical efforts to capture the idea, as exhibited by, for exa-
mple, Zalta’s Object Theory with its comprehension schema ∃x (A!x ∧ ∀F(xF ↔ φ))—where A! is 
the abstractness predicate and xF is the encoding of property F by x (as opposed to the exemplifica-
tion of the property by the thing)—and its ramifications. For a clear statement of the view, see Zalta 
(1993), and for a recent application to the philosophy of mathematics, see Linsky and Zalta (2006).  
The point in the text is rather that we have no independent grounds for espousing such principles. 
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ble is nevertheless determined by what is possible for particular things.16 If something 
is generally possible, then it is so only because of a corresponding possibility for 
something in particular. As an illustration let us consider the question of what makes it 
the case that it is possible that there be a chair occupying an actually empty corner.  
The default intuitive answer is that what makes this generally possible is that some-
thing might have been a chair occupying the corner—presumably one of the actual 
chairs might have been such.  And for that to be the case, presumably a counterfactual 
history ending with a chair in the corner would have had to diverge at some point 
from the actual history of the empty corner, a counterfactual history involving one of 
the actual chairs. The important point is that such general possibilities, or possibilities 
de dicto, have particular witnesses. A general possibility that there be a φ does not float 
free of the possibility of φ-ing for particular things. The monadic possibility-that ob-
tains only because the dyadic possibility-for does. It is the latter that is prior in the or-
der of metaphysical explanation. BF can be seen as giving expression to such priori-
ty.17 We note that Barcan (1946) introduces the Barcan formula as a strict conditional: 
it is not possible for there to be a φ without something possibly φ-ing. This can be 
seen as giving an even closer approximation of the metaphysical priority under con-
sideration. Perhaps an even closer approximation, employing further expressive re-
sources, might be given by the subjunctive conditional that had it not been possible 
for anything to φ, then it would not be possible that there be a φ. 
 There remain the cases of purported general possibility for which there seem to be 
no plausible specific witnesses as discussed in the previous section.  Purported trou-
blemakers for BF have the following structure.  It seems (A) possible that there be a φ.  
And yet it also seems (B) impossible for anything to be a φ, given that nothing is a φ, 
and given that being a φ cannot be had contingently. An anti-essentialist response is to 
proclaim that it is, after all, and against appearances to the contrary, possible for some-
thing that is not a φ to be a φ.18 The plenumist response discussed in the previous sec-
tion proclaims that it is possible for something contingently nonconcrete to be a φ.  
Both anti-essentialism and plenumism respect Seeming (A) while denying Seeming 
(B), giving up on essentialist intuitions and on a Russellian robust sense of reality, re-
                                                      
16 This can be easily extended to cover such mixed cases as the possibility that there be a talking donkey 
descending from Dapple the donkey, where the possibility is general on the position of being a tal-
king donkey but particular on the second position of descending-from. 
17 What about general possibilities of the form ◊∀xφx?  Here the idea can be that such a possibility ob-
tains only because it is possible for a plurality drawn from the totality of things to be such as to sus-
tain the universality of φ-ing per that plurality. This would still be an account of a monadic possibili-
ty-that in terms of a dyadic possibility-for, except now the latter holds with respect to pluralities. For 
present purposes we can set these complications aside. 
18 Thus Parsons (1995, 11): 
 Antiessentialism is required as follows. Certainly there might have been more porcupines than there 
are. So there must be another possible world in which there are things that are porcupines that are 
not porcupines in this world. […] We thus need the possibility that a thing that is not a porcupine in 
this world is one in the other world; that thing thus cannot essentially be or not be a porcupine. 
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spectively. An under-explored alternative is to deny Seeming (A) while respecting 
Seeming (B). However, carving up an alternative position in logical space is clearly not 
enough.  We must also provide a compelling diagnosis for why we are taken in by 
Seeming (A). An error theory of sorts is called for. Why does it seem generally possi-
ble that there be a φ in the relevant cases where it is in fact not so?  We consider the 
question through an example.   
 It can seem possible that there be an additional carbon atom to those that have 
appeared in the entire unfolding history of the universe.  Here we find a general pos-
sibility with no apparent witness in a possibility for any particular thing.  For what ac-
tual thing could have been a carbon atom without already being a carbon atom?  Being 
a carbon atom, like being Wittgenstein’s child, is not contingently instantiable: nothing 
could possibly have this feature without having it necessarily.  Here is an endorsement 
of the idea for being gold and being human in Marcus (1971, 69): 
Being gold or being a human being are not accidental. … No metaphysical mysteries.  Such es-
sences are dispositional properties of a very special kind: if an object had such a property and 
ceased to have it, it would have ceased to exist or it would have changed into something else.19   
So nothing is such that it might have been an additional carbon atom. We conclude 
that, initial appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not really possible that 
there be an additional carbon atom after all.  For suppose such a thing were possible.  
What would make it so? Recall the overall requirement to abide by Russell’s robust 
sense of reality.  This precludes an appeal to the vicissitudes of a merely possible car-
bon atom. There would have to be something about reality—robustly considered—
that makes it so that it is possible that there be an additional carbon atom. Since what 
makes this the case will not turn (we are assuming) on how things might have gone 
with a merely possible carbon atom, and since it is not possible for anything that is 
not a carbon atom to be one, there is nothing about reality to sustain the general pos-
sibility that there be an additional carbon atom.20 That said, plausibly it was possible at 
some point in the unfolding history of the universe that there be something (or things) 
to give rise to an additional carbon atom. This is not to say, however, that at any point 
it was possible that there be an additional carbon atom, which would require there to 
be something for which it was possible to be a carbon atom that was not already a 
carbon atom. Rather, it was possible that something (or things) give rise to an addi-
                                                      
19 Incidentally, given this characterization of being gold and being human as not contingently instantiable, 
the following somewhat tentative reconstruction of Marcus’s position in Linsky and Zalta (1994, 436) 
is likely wrong: 
 From the fact that it is possible that b has a sister, BF requires that there exists something that is pos-
sibly b’s sister. Since b has no sisters, which existing object is it that is possibly b’s sister? Some actua-
lists, notably Ruth Marcus [1986], might defend BF by pointing to an existing woman (possibly one 
closely related to b) and suggesting that she is the thing which both exists and which is possibly b’s 
sister. But the great majority of actualists don’t accept this idea, for they subscribe to certain essentia-
list views about the nature of objects. 
20 The Carnapian alternative that sublimates the general possibility by way of the non-contradictoriness of 
the instantiation of being a carbon atom distinct from any particular carbon atom surely does not 
abide by the Russellian admonition without a much-needed elaboration and defense.  See 2.7 of 
Simchen (2012) for further discussion. 
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tional carbon atom. And for that to obtain, it was possible for something (or things) to 
give rise to an additional carbon atom.21 This, again, does not require that at any point 
in the history of the universe there be something for which it was possible to be an 
additional carbon atom. It only requires that at some point in history there were po-
tential propagators for such a thing.  So it is not possible that there be an additional 
carbon atom after all, but our intuitive draw to the idea that this is possible can be ex-
plained in terms of the plausibility of the possibility that there be a propagator for an 
additional carbon atom. Accordingly, the intuitive appeal of such purported counter-
examples to BF as that it is generally possible that there be an additional carbon atom 
without it being possible for anything in particular to be an additional carbon atom 
can be explained in terms of our mistaking the (genuine) general possibility that some-
thing propagate an additional carbon atom for the (merely purported) general possibil-
ity that something be an additional carbon atom. 
7.  Conclusion  
Such is the most compelling case for BF as a metaphysical principle, a third defense 
that issues neither from the logical status of the schema nor from lofty considerations 
pertaining to the nature of the totality of things and what it is for them to possibly 
bear properties they do not in fact bear.  Let me end by forestalling a natural misun-
derstanding of this third approach to BF as a metaphysical principle.  It might be 
thought that the claim that it was possible that something give rise to an additional 
carbon atom is existentially committing to an additional carbon atom, raising anew the 
specter of mere possibilia.  The thought is that from the general possibility that some-
thing propagate an additional carbon atom (letting ψ stand for the dyadic x propagat-
ing additional carbon atom y, the general possibility would be schematized as       
◊∃x∃y ψxy), it would follow by BF that something is such that it possibly propagates 
an additional carbon atom (∃x◊∃y ψxy), from which it would follow by EI that a pos-
sibly propagates an additional carbon atom (◊∃y ψay), from which it would follow by 
BF again that something is such that it is a possible outcome of propagator a propa-
gating an additional carbon atom (∃y ◊ψay). But the instantiation of the property of 
being a possible outcome of propagator a propagating an additional carbon atom is al-
so the instantiation of the property of being a possible additional carbon atom. So we 
are back to the claim that something is possibly an additional carbon atom.  And what 
might such a thing be?  It appears that this could only be a merely possible additional 
carbon atom. 
 But ‘an additional carbon atom’ should not incur existential commitment in this 
way: the paraphrase in terms of existential quantification is spurious.22 The point is 
widely accepted in cases such as 
                                                      
21 Here BF is followed with respect the possibility that something give rise to an additional carbon atom.   
22 There is some evidence that indefinites in English are never to be construed as existential quantifiers, 
but the general point need not concern us here. (See, however, chapter 4 of Steedman (2012) for a 
construal of indefinites as Skolem terms, taking inspiration from Fine (1995).) 
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(i) Bernard Ortcutt is a spy, 
where there does not seem to be the requirement to construe this as 
(ii) for some x (x spies and x = Bernard Ortcutt). 
It would likewise be a mistake to construe  
(iii) there is an additional carbon atom 
as the doubly existential 
(iv) for some x (for some y (y additional-carbon-atomizes and y = x)), 
or to construe  
(v) it is possible that there be an additional carbon atom 
as 
(vi) possibly (for some x (for some y (y additional-carbon-atomizes and y = x))).   
The correct renderings of (iii) and (v) are, rather, 
(vii) for some x (x is an additional carbon atom)),  
and 
(viii) possibly (for some x (x is an additional carbon atom), 
respectively, with ‘an’ a determiner for ‘additional carbon atom’. In short, the intended 
reading of the claim that it was possible that something give rise to an additional car-
bon atom has ‘an additional carbon atom’ figure in characterizing the relevant monad-
ic property of propagating an additional carbon atom, not unlike the way ‘a baby’ fig-
ures in speaking of fecundity as the ability to have a baby.  BF can remain as attractive 
as ever without requiring us to abandon Russell’s robust sense of reality. 
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